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Abstract
Urban sprawl is rapidly occurring in many Spanish urban areas. The objective of this paper is to
evaluate how the trend of building dispersion of new residential areas may be affecting the fiscal
stability of local Spanish governments. The high variability of the characteristics of Spanish
urban areas as well as the existence of very similar local fiscal structures made this case
particularly interesting. A precise index of urban sprawl, calculated with geo-referenced digital
cartography, was used. Utilising spatially desegregated information of taxes from the Spanish
National Institute for Fiscal Studies allowed for a measure of fiscal burden by local areas and the
ability to distinguish among types of taxes. Control variables were also available at the local
level from the Spanish Census and other databases. Quantile Regressions methodology
supplementing Ordinary Least Square regressions assessed the discrepancy in the results and in
the conclusions of the studied distributions. The results indicate that higher levels of urban
sprawl imply higher local fiscal burden. This is especially clear in the higher part of the local
fiscal burden distribution. By tax categories, the phenomenon of urban sprawl particularly affects
local indirect taxation. Based on these results, local decision-makers should consider that urban
planning is also a fundamental tool to assure long-term local fiscal stability.

Keywords: urban sprawl, fiscal burden, local public services, geo-referenced digital
cartography, quantile regression, Spain

JEL Classification: R1, R5, H7, H8
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1. Introduction
This paper aims to measure the impact of the increasing trend of sprawl in Spanish cities
on the fiscal burden at the local level. From the theoretical perspective, the potential effect of
sprawl on fiscal balances of local governments is not clear. On the one hand, the municipalities
could acquire more resources from construction, local economic activities and property taxes. On
the other hand, the cost of providing services and improving infrastructure could be incremental,
therefore significantly reducing the efficiency in dispersed areas. Previous empirical literature
has concluded that low-density areas negatively impact local service costs and fiscal stability,
but, at the same time, the attraction of population and construction activities could increase the
fiscal revenues.
Since the 2000-th the feasibility studies of local fiscal sustainability started taking a
greater importance primarily due to the need of understanding the efficiencies of municipal
budgets. The diverse approaches to the analysis and management of fiscal conditions were
reflected in the Handbook of Local Government Fiscal Health, edited by Levine et al. (2013),
demonstrating that while there is some agreement on fiscal health as a theoretical concept, there
is still little consensus on how to measure, predict, and manage a decline in fiscal health.
Spain becomes an interesting case in discussions of urban sprawl due to its highly
decentralized government, with 17 regional governments and the 8,114 municipalities that
manage 35% and 13% of total public expenditures, respectively. Besides, Spain is the sixth in the
degree of authority of regional governments1. Different authors have recently addressed the
municipal budget issues, especially in the wake of the economic crisis where not all Spanish

1

According to the Regional Authority Index on the basis of data for 2005, Spain is in the sixth position after
Germany, Belgium, the United States, Canada, and Italy (Hooghe et al., 2010). This index is measured across eight
dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, representation, law-making, executive control, fiscal
control, and constitutional reform.
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municipalities have suffered equally the crisis (Caramés, 2005; Lopez-Laborda et al., 2006;
Suárez et al, 2008; Benito et al., 2010, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2010; Suárez and
Fernández, 2012; Delgado et al., 2015). The local budgetary situation prior to the crisis, such as
the size of the municipality (as the cost of providing the municipal public service is related,
among others, to the greater or lesser population) and the obligation (or not) in the provision of
services, had significant impact on the deterioration of municipal public accounts (Portillo,
2016). This deterioration of the local accounts is also closely related to the evolution of the urban
activity in Spain (Suárez and Fernández, 2012)2. Thus, in the years of the housing bubble, the
Spanish municipalities obtained a significant increase in their income, mainly as a result of the
resources coming from urban planning. Later on, when the real estate bubble hit, local revenues
from taxes, fees, licenses, etc. shrank.
The evolution and advancement of technologies allowed integration of quantitative
information on urban sprawl within different disciplines (geography, town planning, territorial
planning, the environment, economics, sociology and even public health) leading to numerous,
3

and sometimes conflicting, definitions (Galster et al., 2001; Squires, 2002; Davoudi, 2003;
Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; Richardson and Chnag-Hee, 2004; Sturn and Cohen, 2004; Jaeger and
Schwick, 2014). For this study, while considered all indicators, we found the USI indicator
measured by Rubiera et al. (2016) being the most useful and applicable. The authors used
procedure for measuring sprawl proposed by Burchfield et al. (2005) and applied it to the case of
Spain. Section 3.2 provides a more detailed discussion of the USI indicator as the main
explanatory variable for our study of the local fiscal burden in Spain.

2

For example, the Tax on buildings, facilities and works - according to data from the Ministry of Finance and Public
Administration - went from providing 2,637.8 million euros to municipalities in 2006 to raise 482.2 million euros
in 2014.
3
For a reappraisal, see Torrens (2008), and for a focus on European cities, see Salvati and Gargiulo-Morelli (2014).

3

The main contribution of this work is twofold. First, it contributes to the limited literature
on the explanatory analysis of the local fiscal burden on taxpayers through the specified
methodology of defining urban sprawl for the entire national territory of Spain. Second, it uses a
very precise method of defining and measuring urban sprawl. A new digital cartography and
geographical information system allows us to obtain an international comparable urban sprawl
index (USI) that has not been previously used in the literature for evaluation of the fiscal
consequences of urban sprawl. The USI is applied to all the urban areas of Spain. The urban
structure of Spain is particularly interesting, since it contains a complete spectrum of urban areas
of different sizes, economic structures, climatic and geographic conditions, while having very
similar local fiscal systems and local public service obligations.
In the methodology, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimations are supplemented with
the quantile regression (QR) strategy to identify how the effects of sprawl may vary across the
distribution of the local fiscal burden. To observe in depth the variation of results for different
types of taxation, we also separately analyse these effects through the perspective of direct and
indirect taxation typical in the Spanish local fiscal system.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, a brief review of the literature
regarding the urban sprawl phenomenon and the implications from a fiscal perspective is
provided. In section 3, a description of the main variables is presented with the particular
attention to the definition of urban sprawl and the calculation of the index using digital georeferenced cartography; the definition of local fiscal burden and the different taxes are included.
An empirical model with the econometric strategy is presented in section 4. Section 5 exhibits
and discusses the main results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and offers policy implications.

4

2. Literature review
Urban sprawl is one of the most studied and controversial urban phenomena. After the
industrial revolution cities grew upward. While in the second part of the last century the growth
pattern of some North American cities occurred through the intensive use of land, which pushed
the cities further out. The North American model of a sprawled city rapidly extended, first to
Latin America (Polèse and Champain, 2003) and later to Asian cities (Bunnel et al., 2002),
finally becoming a global fenomenon (Bruecker, 2000). Traditionally, the old European cities
were different from the newer ones of America or Asia. The cities of the old continent were
strongly concentrated around a dense historical centre and its commercial and business
extensions (Couch et al., 2007). However, during the last four decades, the new tendencies of
urban sprawl have appeared (Arribas-Bel et al., 2011; Christiansen et al., 2011). According to the
European Commission (2006), eastern and southern countries are the ones most at risk from an
explosive process of urban sprawl.
The case of Spain is one of the most interesting in Europe. In some areas of the Iberian
Peninsula, there is a high pressure for construction developments due to the growing tourism and
the demand for second residences. The Spanish economy has been drastically affected by the
construction sector, suffering one of the largest real estate bubbles of all of Europe (Romero,
2012). Spain had very rapid economic growth during the last four decades of the past century,
4

presenting a very strong, concentrated process of urbanization. Cities such as Madrid and
5

Barcelona doubled their populations in less than twenty years. Other major metropolitan areas in
the country experienced growth characterized by integration of different cities or towns in one
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For a specific analysis of the Madrid case, see Moliní and Salgado (2012) and Rubiera et al. (2017).
Catalan et al. (2008) and Muñoz (2003) develop an urban sprawl analysis for the Mediterranean coast. GarcíaLópez (2012) analyze the specific case of Barcelona.
5
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unit6. Rural areas also lost most of their populations in just two decades (Gutiérrez et al., 2017).
Additionally, the explosion of the tourism sector during the last decades intensely affected many
Spanish cities. According to statistical data from the Household Budget Survey of the National
Statistical Institute, in 2014, approximately 35% of the population of Spain lived in houses, with
11% living in detached houses and 24.2% in semi-detached houses (INE, 2016). The remaining
percentage of the population is distributed among other types of houses, such as flats. The strong
changes in income per capita, social customs and land use pressures have made Spain a victim of
urban sprawl (Rubiera et al., 2016; Gomez-Antonio et al., 2016).
One of the most controversial issues is the relationship between urban sprawl and local
fiscal stability (McGuire and Sjoquist, 2002). The dispersion of the city increases the provisional
costs of local public services, as it tends to undermine the economy of scale and to increase the
costs inefficiently (Carruthers, 2002; Carruters and Ulfarsson, 2003 and 2008). Additionally, as
Carruthers (2002) highlighted, low-density and spatially expansive development patterns are
associated with a higher cost of public services, as the considerable investments are required to
extend basic infrastructure over greater distances to reach relatively fewer number of residents.
Nevertheless, as Hortas-Rico (2014) explained, dispersed cities could attract higher public
resources or national funds associated with the construction activities: planning permits,
construction taxes, and revenues from land value improvements from sales of public land and
assets. Additionally, if the public sector owns the land, it can internalise the benefit of public
investment for development and capture the gains though land sales or increased property prices
(Peterson, 2009). González et al. (2013) also found evidence that the municipalities located close
to large metropolitan areas in Spain were more tolerant of sprawl and attracted population. Thus,

6

As an example, see the case of Asturias studied in González et al. (2013).
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this policy allowed inflow of higher fiscal resources for these municipalities, because, the
amount of transfers from the central government to local councils is linked to the size of
municipal population.
The existing empirical literature does not offer clear answers on the overall impact of
sprawl on local revenues, fiscal sustainability and the level of fiscal burden. Burchell and
Listokin (1978), as well as Burchell et al. (2002) standardised a simulation method to evaluate
the cost-revenue impact of a particular land-use development, named the Cost of Community
Service (CCS). Since the seminal work of Burchell and Listokin (1978) many researchers have
used this approach to evaluate the fiscal impact of alternative scenarios, testing the effects of
different urban densities and spatial patterns. Kotchen and Schulte (2009) summarised the results
in a recent meta-analysis that compiled the results of 125 CCS evaluations that were prepared for
the US localities. The key finding of this literature suggested the revenues increase along with
the growing population and the density, but the relevance of these variables clearly depends on
local factors, such as the structure of the local economy and the scope of municipal services. For
instance, density loses its relevancy in agricultural localities, and the population size appears less
important when school services should be provided. The conclusions significantly vary from one
place to another. Considering that this meta-analysis was made only for the US localities, the
potential differences in the conclusions among different countries with different fiscal
programmes and local government responsibilities may change much more intensively.
From the empirical perspective, the evidence about the impact of urban sprawl over fiscal
sustainability is very limited. Heikka and Craig (1991), Kelsey (1996), Bunnell (1998),
Carruthers (2002), and Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003 and 2008) studied the impact of

7

alternative residential developments on the fiscal position of local governments, finding that in
general, the local governments in more disperse areas present higher indebtedness.
Through the contributions of Hortas-Rico and Solè-Olle (2010) and Hortas-Rico (2014)
the fiscal perspective applied to the case of Spain has been wider studied, if compared with other
European countries. In Hortas-Rico and Solè-Olle (2010), the impact of sprawl on local services
costs was studied for a database of 2,500 Spanish municipalities and it was measured by
population density using OLS applied to the cross-sectional data from 2003. Meanwhile, HortasRico (2014) studied the relation between sprawl and local budgets using a panel vector
autoregressive model with data from 4,000 Spanish municipalities for the period from 1994 to
2005. Sprawl was also mainly measured by means of density variables. Both studies concluded
that the sprawl forces an increase in local budget expenditures due to the higher cost of new
infrastructure and greater provision of costs for local public services.
In contrast to the studies of the cost for providing public services focused on the revenues
side of the municipal budgets, we find little literary stream analysing the Spanish local tax
burden (Martinez-Vazquez and Sans-Sanz, 2007; Hortas-Rico and Solé-Olle, 2010). Most of
them focus on specific geographic areas (Cárcaba, 2003; Lago Peñas, 2004; Zafra and López,
2006), and only a few studies include the entire national territory. In the latter case, we find the
work of Carrasco et al. (2006), who carry out an exploratory analysis of the municipal tax burden
and the works of Solé-Ollé (2006) and Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007), where they use a sample of
more than 500 municipalities throughout the national territory. In turn, Bosch et al. (2014)
estimate an equation of the fiscal capacity for the two main Spanish local taxes of 86 Spanish
municipalities in 2008 finding that the central costs incurred by large municipalities are offset by
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their greater fiscal capacity, but that the same is not true for municipalities that serve as
political/administrative capitals.
As Hortas-Rico and Solè-Olle (2010) noted, the most fundamental point of empirical
literature is the available capabilities for measuring the sprawl. Traditionally, databases only
permitted the ability to approximate sprawl measurements by means of population density or
density plus a combination of other demographic variables. However, the development of digital
cartography with geo-referenced information allows for more precise and comparable
measurements of sprawl. The use of this new approach for the quantification of sprawl allows for
the ability to revise the empirical analysis, thus providing new and interesting conclusions. There
is an opportunity to obtain new evidence regarding the impact of sprawl on local fiscal
programmes by using sustainable geo-referenced information.

3. Studying the Spanish case: Variables of local fiscal burden, urban sprawl index and
other control variables
3.1 Local fiscal burden as a dependent variable: definition and measurement
An important aspect to emphasize is the lack of homogeneity in the calculation of fiscal
burden. This is a complex task due to the great heterogeneity in both population density and
socio-demographic characteristics (Benito et al., 2010). In some literature fiscal burden is
defined as the total amount of taxes levied on the citizens of the Spanish municipalities, where
several methods have been proposed to measure the potential revenues of a municipality: i) tax
collection; ii) macroeconomic indicators, including municipal GDP or municipal income; and iii)
microeconomic indicators (Zafra and López, 2006; Carrasco et al., 2006). In contrast, Cárcaba
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(2003)7 defines fiscal burden as the volume of tax revenues relative to disposable household
income, while Delgado (2006) measures tax burden as the proportion of taxes (including Social
Security contributions) in GDP. Unlike these latter methods based on macroeconomic indicators,
Bosch et al. (2014) use microeconomic ones through a Representative Tax System (RTS) by
using the share of each type of tax in a representative budget and the tax base expressed in per
capita terms.
In this study we define tax burden as the quotient between local tax revenues and the
number of inhabitants, based on the first method aforementioned.
The highest level of spatial desegregation of the public administration in Spain is the
municipality. Spain is made up of 8,114 municipalities (excluding the autonomous cities of
Ceuta and Melilla), of which 83.76 percent are the municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants
and they account for 12.73 percent of Spanish population (see Table 1). For comparison,
combined the smallest municipalities have almost the same population size as the two largest
municipalities with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, Madrid and Barcelona municipal areas,
which account for the 10.38 percent of population. But these municipalities are also, in general,
very small in terms of the area and most of the large cities cover several of them 8. In some
specific cases, like Madrid or Barcelona, one city includes more than 50 municipalities. For this
reason, we should delimit the urban metropolitan areas.
We select a sample of 657 Spanish municipalities for year 2011, considering different
cohort of local fiscal burden (by quantiles), in order to approximate possible effects produced by
different levels of household income, according to the second method established to measure
7

This author criticizes that the use of number of inhabitants ignores the greater fiscal burden due to the income level
of citizens and adds that it would be necessary to establish socio-economic variables in order to expand the
characterization of the financial analysis of municipalities.
8
See Figure 1, in which the municipal Spanish structure is mapped, and the real urban extensions over the municipal
borders are represented.
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local fiscal burden (macroeconomic issues). We chose the year 2011 because it corresponds to
the first year of crisis, where we can see its effects on the deterioration of the local public budget
to which the municipalities did not react quickly. This financial situation was materialized in
greater local expenditures in comparison to local revenues. This allows us to eliminate, in a
certain way, the impact of political decisions or factors from the study. We focus only on taxes,
both-direct and indirect, corresponding to chapters I and II of the liquidated income budget, for
two reasons. First, they are coercive and recurrent. Second, chapter III of the income budget
(corresponding to fees and other revenues) has been heavily influenced throughout the period
analysed by the urban activity and its inclusion would produce a bias in the local fiscal burden9.
Some important aspects considered in the calculation of the fiscal burden. The local
financing system in Spain can obtain resources from their own assets, their taxes, current
transfers and capital from other public entities, wealth income, sales of real investments and even
resort to debt. The municipalities also obtain resources from the CCAA, although in the latter
case this process has been variable in the different regions, which has led them to an unequal and
asymmetric development (Fuster, 2010). Additionally, municipalities receive grants drawn from
central tax revenues without normative capacity or as a simple share of state revenues, according
to various indicators of fiscal capacity and need (Delgado, 2012).
The fiscal regime of the Spanish local taxes is dual and distinguishes between large
municipalities (those with more than 75,000 inhabitants and capitals of provinces or regions) and
the rest (with special treatment of tourism jurisdictions). All Spanish municipalities impose three
compulsory taxes: on property, economic activity, and motor vehicles. Besides, all municipalities

9

It would have been desirable to subtract, from chapter III, the share of revenues corresponding to the urban activity,
but there is no available data, since we only have the information aggregated by chapters. Nonetheless, at the
aggregate level, we have calculated that the revenues associated with urbanistic activities in chapter III for 2011
represented 2.19% from the total of non-financial revenues (MFPA, 2013).
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above a certain population tend to avail themselves of two non-compulsory taxes as well: tax on
construction and building work and tax on the increase in the value of urban building land.
The local taxes can be divided into direct and indirect taxes. According to the direct taxes
(in the chapter II of local revenues), along with the surcharges of state and regional direct taxes,
four taxes stand out, where the municipalities have a greater autonomy when managing them:


Tax on property: it is the main source of municipal revenues, of real character and annual
periodicity. It taxes the value of the real estate, fundamentally the right of property. In
particular, the measure of the tax base is the cadastral value of the properties located in the
municipality.



Tax on motor vehicles: it is periodic, of annual levy, real and patrimonial nature. It registers
the ownership of vehicles suitable for driving on public roads as consideration for local
public services put to the service of traffic, such as differentiation by the use of equipment
and engines of different power and the negative external effects caused by pollution. Its
quotas are established by the central government but municipalities can increased it by using
a coefficient that ranges from 1 to 2.



Tax on the increase in the value of urban building land: it taxes the increase in value
experienced by urban land at the moment the property or other rights are transferred. It lacks
periodicity.



Tax on economic activity: the municipal tax base (the so-called Cuotas mínimas) is the
estimated contents of each business, professional and artistic activity weighted by
coefficients depending on the location and turnover of the activities present in the
municipality. Therefore, it comprises the mere exercise of the economic activity, but not the
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actual returns of the activity, which has caused to be a highly criticized tax. This has led to an
increase in central government transfers to compensate for the loss of municipal revenues.
In relation to indirect taxes, it highlights tax on construction and building work. It accrues
for the realization of any construction, installation or work for which it is required to obtain the
corresponding building (or urban) planning permit, so it is not periodic. Its creation is relatively
recent, in 1988, and has no previous history (background) in Spain or in other countries10.

3.2. Urban sprawl index as the main independent variable: definition and measurement
Burchfield et al. (2005) classify the phenomenon of urban sprawl as “whether the
residential development is scattered or compact,” such that “in the sprawling areas much of the
land immediately surrounding the average house will not itself be developed” bringing the
definition of urban sprawl down to only one dimension, the degree to which building is
dispersed, thus simplifying quantification. These authors propose an Urban Sprawl Index (USI)
consistent with their definition, which can be obtained via the possibilities offered by Geographic
Information Systems (henceforth, GIS). These authors specifically use TM Landsat imagery at a
resolution of 30x30 m, providing photo interpretation in a raster GIS scenario. This scenario
indicates the delimiting of the pixels of the image as urban or rural, and for each pixel considered
urban, counts the number of other urban pixels that fall within an area of 1 km 2 around it,
applying the following formula:
USI = 100 [1 −

Urban pixel
]
182 𝜋

[1]

10

It is important to point out that of the five taxes mentioned, three are related to the urban activity: tax on property,
tax on construction and building work and tax on the increase in the value of urban building land which is indicative
of the financial problems that in the crisis of the construction are taking almost all of the Spanish town councils.
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Thus, high values of USI (up to 100) indicate high levels of dispersion or sprawl, while
low values indicate concentration (Burchfield et al., 2005). This paper has had a major impact,
and the approach of these authors has spread to the spheres of both geography and urban
economics, with the subsequent publication of a large number of papers based on the original
idea by Burchfield et al. (2005). Some of this research has broadened the scope of analysis to
aspects of urban morphology or the structure of cities.
In Rubiera et al. (2016) the procedure for measuring sprawl proposed by Burchfield et al.
(2005), formula [1], is applied to the specific case of Spain by exploiting the potential of the
databases available for this country. Spain is covered by a wide variety of geo-referenced photos
and maps with different scales and sources. One of the most precise databases comprises the
orthophoto series (1:5000 scale) generated within the context of the PNOA program produced in
collaboration with the IGN (National Geographic Institute of Spain) and the autonomous regions.
This is the basis for producing the 1:25000 maps made by IGN in the BTN25 series. Formerly,
starting in the 1970s, the IGN published vector maps based on traditional photogrammetric
methods, namely, the BCN25 maps. Both series, BCN25 and BTN25, form the basis from which
we obtain the built-over surface areas and economic data obtained from different official sources
(CNIG, AEMET and INE) referred to the 2001 year.
This paper applies similar with Rubiera et al. (2016) estimates of USI for the studied 657
municipal areas in Spain. The USI estimates are mapped in Figure 1. The average USI for all
Spanish urban areas is 68.81. There is a strong dispersion in this index within the territory: from
the metropolitan area of Seville, with the lowest value of 48.13, to Lleida, with the highest level
of 81.12. Other important urban areas with a high level of sprawl include Madrid, Granada and

14

Vitoria. At the other extreme are cities such as Caceres, Lugo and Santiago, with the lowest
levels of sprawl. Barcelona, practically, presents the national average value.

3.3. Other control variables: definition and measurement
While the assessment of the local fiscal burden with consideration of the new
methodology for measuring the urban sprawl is the focal point of the study; however for deeper
understanding of these effects we considered the variety of other factors that could contribute to
this discussion.
Thus, the factors used in the explanation of the financial performance of public
administrations can capture both the expenditure and the revenue sides of municipal budgets. In
relation to the revenue side, its volume is conditioned by the amount of revenue that can be
collected. In this regard, the size of the fiscal revenues depends on various socioeconomic,
demographic, fiscal and political variables, such as the economic level of the municipality,
population, and the costs of providing services; although the sign of the influence of the
economic level on the fiscal pressure has not been unequivocally demonstrated in the literature
(Benito et al., 2010)11. In this regard, for instance, Delgado (2012) includes the population or
total assets, and per capita income and per capita grants received as control variables to measure
the local tax mix in Spain. Other studies also include variables capturing the age structure and
the level of education of the population; however, these variables do not have a significant effect
on the local fiscal burden (Bosch et al., 2014).

11

Fiscal and political factors are not exogenous to the fiscal capacity itself and, as a result, we might face problems
of endogeneity. In order to avoid this problem, these kind of factors are not considered in this study. Besides, some
authors such as Benito y Bastida (2008) conclude that political ideology has no clear influence on the fiscal
situation.
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In some ways, the local public costs could also be seen as potential revenue raisers. Apart
from the obvious cases of commuting (work, studies, shopping, administrative activities and
leisure) and tourism, which are easily identified as potential sources of revenue for recipient
municipalities through different channels, other socioeconomic and demographic variables,
including immigration, unit costs (wages) or activity substitution, could have a positive impact
on a municipality’s fiscal burden. Indeed, all of them could attract more economic activity and,
hence, increase directly and indirectly local tax revenues (Bosch et al., 2014).
Few studies have tested whether geographic factors also affect the fiscal capacity, e.g.
Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007) included a matrix of proximity to analyse tax mimicking, and
therefore analysis undertaken in this paper also represents a new contribution to the testing of
this relationship.
The decision on the municipal tax collection capacity is influenced by the level of public
expenditure that is intended to be made and by the transfers that are received from the central
and regional public administrations and we focus on the liquidated taxes of municipality.
Assuming that the municipal government has no influence over them, the taxes paid will depend
on a series of factors that will determine the level of expenditure that is intended to be realized
and, therefore, the level of taxation that will have to be established in order to finance it. Thus,
with consideration of aforementioned objectives, we combine all supplemental to USI control
variables in three main types: socioeconomic, demographic and geographic. In addition to the
USI there are total of twelve supplemental control variables included in the analysis (Table 2).
Except for two dummy variables, all other control variables are calculated using databases from
the Spanish National Institute of Statistics and Spanish National Institute of Geography.

16

4.

Empirical model and econometric strategy

Based on the above information, the basic empirical model proposed can be written as:
𝐿𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐵𝑈𝑅11 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑆𝐼01 + [𝛽𝑆 𝑆 + 𝛽𝐷 𝐷 + 𝛽𝐺 𝐺] + 𝑢

[2]

where,
LFISBUR01 -local fiscal burdens for 2011 (Section 3.1)
USI01

-urban sprawl index in 2001, main independent variable (Section 3.2)

S, D, G

-vectors with socioeconomic, demographic and geographical control variables
(Section 3.3 and Table 2)

u

-random error term of the estimation
Equation [2] could be estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) regression, but we are

interested in observing whether the fiscal burden changes along with the distribution. This is
possible using the quantile regressions (QR) approach (Koenker and Basset, 1978), which fits
quantiles of local fiscal burden to a linear function of covariates. In its simplest form, the least
absolute deviation estimator fits medians to a linear function of covariates. The method of QR is
more attractive, because medians and quantiles are less sensitive to outliers than means and
therefore OLS regressions. Indeed, the likelihood estimator is more efficient than the OLS one.
QRs allow different solutions at different quantiles to be interpreted as differences in the
response of the dependent variable to changes in the regressors; thus, quantile regressions detect
asymmetries in the data that cannot be detected by OLS. However, the most important feature is
that quantile regressions analyses the similarity or dissimilarity of regression coefficients at
different points of the dependent variable, which in this case is the local fiscal burden; it allows
one to consider the possible heterogeneity across the intensity in local fiscal burden.
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The following expression presents the adaptation of equation [2] in terms of QR:
𝜏
𝐿𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐵𝑈𝑅11
= 𝛽0𝜏 + 𝛽1𝜏 𝑈𝑆𝐼01 + [𝛽𝑠𝜏 𝑆 + 𝛽𝐷𝜏 𝐷 + 𝛽𝐺𝜏 𝐺] + 𝑢

[3]

where, coefficients 𝛽𝑖𝜏 represent the returns to covariates at the τth quantile of the local fiscal
burden. The model is estimated by using the least-absolute value minimization technique, and
bootstrap estimates of the asymptotic variances of the quantile coefficients are calculated with 20
repetitions.
The null hypothesis for equation [2] suggests that 𝐻0= 𝛽1= 𝛽 𝑆 = 𝛽𝐷 = 𝛽𝐺 = 0 and equation
[3] suggests that 𝐻0: 𝛽1𝜏 = 𝛽𝑆𝜏 = 𝛽𝐷𝜏 = 𝛽𝐺𝜏 = 0, indicating that coefficients associated with the
independent variables do not impact the dependent variables.
The 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 associated with the coefficients we derive in the tests should exceed
the value for the two-tailed t-distribution test at 5% significance level (1.96), defining the
significance of a given explanatory variable in relation to the local fiscal burden with the
confidence interval at 95%. Additionally, the test results also provide information on the
significance of explanatory variables at 10% and 1% levels, contributing in a better assessment
of the impact.
We compare OLS regression with QR estimates of the model in different quantiles (0.25,
0.5 and 0.75) and use three regression models to estimate the impact of the explanatory variables
on the fiscal burden with consideration of the type of taxation: direct, indirect and aggregate of
both. Thus, while the OLS regression models the relation between the independent variables
(USI, and combination of socioeconomic, demographic and geographic variables) and the
conditional mean of the dependent variable (local fiscal burden), the QR models the relationship
of the same explanatory variables and the conditional quantiles of the response variable, giving
more comprehensive picture of the effects of independent variables on the studied variable.
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5. Main results
Table 3 present the results obtained with the estimation of the equations [2] (by OLS) and
[3] (by QR) using all local taxes in the calculation of the fiscal burden as dependent variable and
with the independents variables summarized in Table 2. A heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent estimator is used to provide a robust estimation of the covariance matrix of the
parameters of a regression-type model. The first column of results presents the coefficient
estimation by OLS regression. The following three columns report the coefficients and tstatistics for QR model estimating conditional distribution of the local fiscal burden at three
quantiles (τth): 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. Basic tests R2 and F-Change as well as a Pseudo R2 for the
QR are presented at the end of the table. In order to observe which type of taxes are more
affected by urban sprawl the estimations of Table 3 are further analysed through two different
sections. Table 4 provides information on the same model, but using only direct taxes. Table 5
offers a summary of the analysis relevant to the indirect taxes. In both cases we apply similar
estimation procedure and use the same list of explanatory variables.
As the main objective of this paper was to measure the specific effects of the sprawl,
measured by means of an urban sprawl index (USI) calculated with digital cartography and
geographical information systems, over the local fiscal burden, we address this discussion first
followed by the results associated with the other control variables.

5.1. Results addressing USI
The effects of urban sprawl on the local fiscal burden vary across the types of empirical
methodologies used, conditional distribution of fiscal burden and types of taxation. Thus, after
controlling for the aforementioned factors (Section 3.3), the OLS regression detected
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comparatively less strong relation of USI on local fiscal burden (only at 10% significance).
Meanwhile the QR methodology defined a very significant impact of urban sprawl on local fiscal
burden as we moved up the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. As it is observable
in Figure 2 (a) and Table 3, the urban sprawl index coefficient is not significantly different from
zero in the quantiles 0.25 and 0.5, but it is clearly significant and positive in the quantile 0.75.
This growing-up behaviour indicates that the sprawl is not relevant for the lower levels of local
fiscal burden, but it has a clearly significant and positive effect in the higher levels of local fiscal
burden. We find similar effects of USI on the local fiscal burden limited to the direct taxation in
QR methodology; however, in case of OLS regression, the test did not detect significance in
relation of USI and local fiscal burden (Table 4). It is very interesting to observe that the impact
of USI is much stronger in case of indirect taxation. Here, USI has a significant effect on higher
levels of conditional distribution (0.5 and 0.75 quantiles) of the local fiscal burden in indirect
taxes in QR and the effect is also statistically significant in OLS (Table 5). This is directly
related to the characteristics of local indirect taxation in Spain, which is mainly focused on
taxation of construction related activities and urban sprawl has a direct impact on that.
From the technical standpoint the discrepancy in outcomes for OLS and QR
methodologies justify the use of QR as a more accurate econometric instrument for defining the
effects of urban sprawl on the local fiscal burden in Spain. Additionally, the discussed outcomes
confirmed the useful strategy for analysing tax burden through the types of taxation. The OLS
methodology detected less strong statistical significance (10% significance level) from the USI
to all taxes, which was mainly attributable to the share of strong relation of the effect of USI on
indirect taxes. On the contrary, based on the OLS the direct taxation was insignificantly impacted
by USI.

Nevertheless, the QR methodology, while confirming strong fiscal pressure of USI
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through indirect taxation, also confirmed strong contribution of USI on the higher levels of
conditional distribution (0.75 quantile) of fiscal pressure in all taxes and direct taxes (Figure 2
(a), (b) and (c)).
From the economics perspective, it is interesting to observe that while the construction
and building businesses, as one of the primary beneficiaries of urban sprawl, contribute a
significant share of taxes in the form of indirect taxation; however, the USI becomes a significant
factor for the taxpayers in the higher levels of direct tax distribution, causing them to reallocate
considerable share of their taxes in support of increasing costs for providing municipal services
and growing infrastructure.
These results are coherent with the ones obtained in previous similar analysis for the
Spanish case, like the ones of Hortas-Rico and Solè-Olle (2010) and Hortas-Rico (2014). They
also confirm the main international evidence about the negative effect of sprawl in the local
public services costs or local fiscal sustainability (see, for instance, Heikka and Craig (1991),
Kelsey (1996), Bunnell (1998), Carruthers (2002), Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003 and 2008)).

5.2 Results addressing other control variables
All the control variables considered are significant in the OLS estimation and, in general,
these are expected outcomes if considered the previous empirical literature on the causes of local
fiscal burden (Section 3.3 and the recent studies for the Spanish case of Bosch and Solé-Ollé
(2007) and Bosch et al. (2014)). The QR results reveal interesting additional information. Thus,
we obtain that overall the local fiscal system in Spain is progressive, where taxpayers in higher
conditional distribution of fiscal burden contribute more significantly in supporting fiscal health
of municipalities and the main fiscal sources are drawn from the direct taxation. The variables
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that have a significant impact on the overall conditional distribution of the fiscal burden with a
greater magnitude as it moves up, explaining higher local fiscal pressure, are the in the local
economy, location in terms of longitude and whether it’s a unemployment ratio, the percentage
of foreign population, the location quotient of primary sector coastal municipality. When
the estimations are focused on indirect taxes most of the variables lose their significance with
only some particular cases. These observations are true for the majority of socio-economic,
demographic and geographic variables considered, with some exceptions which we will discuss
below.
The results for the socio-economic condition index and the specialization index of local
economy suggest that overall the fiscal pressure has a progressive nature and it is related to direct
taxation. However, our analysis suggests some distortions across conditional distribution of the
fiscal burden. Thus, while the taxpayers in 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles are significantly involved in
supporting of the programs targeted to socio-economic conduction, the ones in the median are
not contributing at the same level. The similar distortive result is derived for the case of the
specialization index of local economy, where the main fiscal pressure for supporting these
activities is on the taxpayers in the 0.75 quantile of the conditional distribution. These results are
coherent across all taxes and direct taxes, suggesting uneven distribution of fiscal pressure across
taxpayers’ groups.
The cities that are capitals of the Spanish Autonomous Communities or Provinces,
which have to provide a larger range of public services also contribute in higher tax burden.
Here, we observe that the fiscal programs are supported by both direct and indirect taxation. In
case of the aggregate fiscal pressure the analysis suggest that the tax burden across its
conditional distribution is comparatively fair distributed. However, the studies for tax burden by
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type of taxation suggest that overall the indirect taxes have stronger contribution than the direct
taxes. In case of direct taxes the ones in the lower and median (0.25 and 0.5quantiles) points of
conditional distribution of fiscal burden are under stronger pressure, and it becomes insignificant
in the higher levels (0.75). While the direct taxation assesses the regressive nature of tax burden,
the indirect taxation analysis suggests that the majority of the programs in municipal and
provincial capitals are supported through influx of resources from building and construction
activities and infrastructure development.
In case of occupation ratio, we asses higher fiscal pressure in the lower (0.25) quantile
and the pressure is insignificant in higher quantiles. This information holds for both, all taxes and
direct tax, cases. This analysis suggests more regressive character of local direct taxation.
Additionally, when we combine information derived from the analysis of indirect fiscal pressure,
here the OLS detects less strong (10% significance) fiscal pressure related to the increase in
occupation ratio, while the QR does not detect any significance along the conditional
distribution. Economically, the results related to the occupation indirectly suggest the distortion
of the local fiscal system. Here we can assume, while the value of the taxable base for direct
taxes, such as property, land and number of motor vehicles, is lower in the areas with lower rate
of occupation; however people are subjected to a significant fiscal pressure, which in turn, may
cause the most successful employees to move to the regions with higher occupation and
insignificant fiscal pressure. In this instance we would anticipate municipal policies contributing
in more balanced fiscal pressure across all groups of employed population.
On the contrary, in general the explanatory variables for population density, the distance
to metropolitan area of more than 500,000 inhabitants and the location of primary sector area
in the local economy perform almost identically when all taxes and direct taxes are considered.
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In both cases the tests assess a very significant negative relation of these explanatory variables in
relation to the local fiscal burden, suggesting less fiscal pressure when people move further out
of the large metropolitan areas or primary sectors of economic activity and similarly in the areas
with higher density. Interestingly, the change in density does not cause fiscal pressure in indirect
taxes using OLS method; on the contrary, the QR methodology assesses a negative significant
impact of density on the lower level (0.25) of conditional distribution of the indirect tax burden.
In case of indirect fiscal pressure for metropolitan areas of more than 500,000
inhabitants, the OLS methodology suggests comparatively weaker (10% significance level)
pressure due to the change in the distance; however, the QR does not find evidence of strong
causality. In case of location of primary sector of local economy both the OLS and QR in its
median (10% significance) and higher quantile assess a negative and significant effect on fiscal
burden. In the context of these three explanatory variables, it can be assumed that the lowest
density areas and further distance from the primary sector of local economy promoted
construction activities with beneficial regulations addressing indirect taxation. Additionally, it
can be assumed that non-tax, but intergovernmental transfers were the main sources of local
revenues that covered expenditures associated with the changes in density of population and in
distances from large metropolitan areas and primary sectors of local economy, such as costs of
infrastructure, construction and building developments, etc. These outcomes are consistent with
the available literature (Hortas-Rico M., 2014).
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6. Conclusions and policy implications
The primary objective of this paper was a thorough study of the effects of urban sprawl
on local fiscal burden, while considering a number of socio-economic, demographic and
geographic control variables, applied to the case of Spain. Previous literature accumulated
evidence that indicates that higher levels of sprawl undermine the economies of scale in the
provision of public services and increase the needs for investments in infrastructure in larger
areas with lower density. But, at the same time, the sprawled areas are more attractive for builder
and construction development companies and influx of population, and both are relevant factors
to increase the fiscal revenues.
Our results for the case of Spain show that the relationship between urban sprawl and
local fiscal burden vary across types of taxation and conditional distribution of fiscal pressure.
Overall, there is an evidence indicating that the sprawled cities increase the fiscal pressure. This
outcome has stronger holds with considerations that the fiscal revenues could be incremented
through the local taxes on construction activities and the higher transfers for the growing
population supported by the Spanish fiscal system. We also observed that the urban sprawl
appears more relevant to the higher levels of the conditional distribution of local fiscal burden
for both direct and indirect taxes. This means that the level of sprawl is especially important for
studying the localities with higher fiscal pressures. Finally, we also observed the fiscal burden
associated with the sprawled areas is more evenly distributed through indirect taxation, which is
mainly associated with the influx of local revenues from construction and development activities.
These conclusions suggest several policy implications. First, according to our results
relaxing the urban planning or the land policies in order to increase local fiscal revenues can
destabilize the fiscal sustainability on the long run. Second, compact cities are not only more
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sustainable in terms of energy consumption or social stability, as several research studies have
highlighted, but they are also more sustainable in terms of fiscal pressure. Finally, urban
planning, in addition to being a land use and environmental tool, should also be considered as an
effective instrument for maintaining fiscal sustainability.
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APPENDICES
Table 1. Municipalities and population in Spain, year 201112

Number
Inhabitants
(in thousands)
>1,000
500 -1,000
100-500
50-100
20-50
5-20
<5
Total
Number
Inhabitants
(in thousands)
>1,000
500 -1,000
100-500
50-100
20-50
5-20
<5
Total

Spain(a)
%
total in
% in
Number
numbe Population
total
Municipalitie
r of
(01/01/2011) popul
s
munici
ation
palities
2
0.02
4,880,486
10.38
4
0.05
2,743,809
5.83
57
0.70
11,186,947
23.79
80
0.99
5,696,848
12.11
253
3.12
7,499,173
15.95
922
11.36
9,034,186
19.21
6796
83.76
5,988,192
12.73
8114
100
47,029,641
100
Sample: Extended Urban Zones (EUZ)
Number
Population
Municipalitie
%
%
(01/01/2011
s
2
0.30
4,880,486
16.62
4
0.61
2,743,809
9.34
52
7.91
9,921,453
33.78
74
11.26
5,327,459
18.14
111
17.05
3,404,624
11.59
240
36.53
2,619,183
8.92
174
26.33
472,581
1.61
657
100
29,369,595
100

Population/
Municipalities

2,440,243
685,952.25
196,262.23
71,210.60
29,641
9,798.47
881.13
5,796.11
Population/
Municipalities
2,440,243
685,952.25
190,797.17
71,992.69
30,672.29
10,913.26
2,715.98
44,702.58

Note: (a) with the exception of Ceuta y Melilla.
Source: Own elaboration from data of MFPA (2013).

12 This table shows the percentage of municipalities included in the sample from the total existing for each cohort
by population. Nevertheless, the classifications for the Extended Areas related to USI are different, since they
included the sprawled areas around the most populated municipalities. Thus, for instance, under this criteria Madrid
or Barcelona includes more than 50 municipalities.
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Figure 1. Map of urban sprawl index for the major Spanish urban and metropolitan areas,
200113

13 For detailed information on the USI estimates for the major Spanish urban and metropolitan areas, please see
Rubiera et al. (2016).
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Table 2. Variables: description and descriptive statistics
Variable

Description

Source

Year

Median

Min

Max

IEF (Spanish
National Institute of
Fiscal Studies)

2011

389.68

0

957.12

CNIG (Spanish
National Institute of
Geography)

2001

66.57

23.63

96.17

INE (Spanish
National Institute of
Statistics)

2001

1.03

0.67

1.36

(a)

INE

2001

3.36

1.45

7.95

LQPRIM01

Location quotient of primary sector in the
local economy

INE

2001

89.34

2.94

631.27

LQSERV01

Location quotient of service sector
activities in the local economy

INE

2001

4.04

0.67

13.48

CAPITAL

Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
municipality is the capital of the
autonomous community or province and 0
otherwise

-

-

-

0

1

UNEM%01

Percentage of occupied population over
the sum of employed and unemployed
population

INE

2001

11.47

1.43

33.11

OCUP%01

Percentage of unemployed population over
total population

INE

2001

0.51

0.25

0.70

Dependent variable: LFISBUR
LFISBUR11

Local fiscal burden

Main independent variable: USI01
Urban sprawl index calculated according
with equation [1]

USI01

Control variables
Socioeconomic variables (S)
SOCECI01

Socio-economic condition index
Specialization index of the local economy

SPECI01

Demographic variables (D)
DENSITY01

Habitants per km2

INE

2001

1.89

0.04

30.13

FOREIN%01

Percentage of foreign population over total
population

INE

2001

0.04

0.00

0.49

CNIG

-

-1.89

-8.85

3.13

-

Geographical variables (G)
EASTING

Location in terms of longitude

COAST

Dummy variable that takes value 1 for the
coastal municipalities of and 0 otherwise

-

-

DISTMA01

Distance (in Km) to a metropolitan area of
more than 500,000 inhabitants

CNIG

2001

0
1.19

1
0

5.60

Note: (a) The specialization index is calculated for each local area r applying this formula: 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼 =
𝐿𝑛 [∑𝑛

1

𝑖=1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖

2

√∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖 (𝐿𝑄𝑖 − 100)) ], where LQi is the location quotient of sector i for local area r; and Ei is the

employment in sector i for area r. Accordingly, values tend to -∞ when the degree of specialization in the local area is identical to
that of the whole national economy; the value tends to +∞ as the specialization profile of the local area diverges from the overall
Spanish specialization (i.e., when the LLM is more specialized in one or more of the n sectors analyzed).
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Table 3. OLS and QR estimates calculating the local fiscal burden with all taxes (a)
OLS

QR
0.25

0.50

0.75

-280.82
(-2.46)**

-77.20
(-0.76)

-116.72
(-0.86)

-418.70
(-2.96)***

0.99
(1.94)*

-0.28
(-0.63)

0.98
(1.61)

1.67
(2.64)***

SOCECI01

276.40
(2.81)***

214.13
(2.43)**

186.86
(1.60)

420.88
(3.44)***

SPECI01

21.37
(3.33)***

6.17
(1.07)

5.46
(0.71)

30.22
(3.79)***

LQPRIM01

-0.25
(-4.15)***

-0.18
(-3.27)***

-0.17
(-2.38)**

-0.26
(-3.39)***

LQSERV01

18.75
(4.13)***

10.08
(2.48)**

22.54
(4.18)***

24.37
(4.33)**

CAPITAL

52.77
(2.71)***

64.68
(3.71)***

55.22
(2.39)**

52.40
(2.17)**

OCUP%01

296.58
(2.45)**

229.99
(2.13)**

248.11
(1.73)*

175.48
(1.17)

UNEM%01

6.96
(3.85)***

5.82
(3.60)***

5.67
(2.64)***

8.43
(3.73)***

DENSITY01

-16.72
(-5.78)***

-17.97
(-6.93)***

-20.78
(-6.04)***

-21.48
(-5.98)***

FOREIN%01

401.36
(3.68)***

195.59
(2.00)**

289.02
(2.23)**

609.74
(4.51)***

DISTMA01

-17.38
(-3.13)***

-17.38
(-3.13)***

-13.84
(-2.10)**

-18.57
(-2.70)***

EASTING

9.48
(3.52)***

9.50
(3.94)***

11.78
(3.68)***

10.16
(3.04)***

COAST

72.77
(5.52)***

72.77
(5.52)***

54.13
(4.59)***

84.34
(5.16)***

0.26

0.27

0.29

Constant

USI01

Ajusted R2

0.41

2

Pseudo R

F-Change

35.98

Note: *, ** and *** represent estimates significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
(a)

To overcome any possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms in the models, an
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator is used to provide a robust estimation of the
covariance matrix of the parameters of a regression-type model.
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Table 4. OLS and QR estimates calculating the local fiscal burden with direct taxes (a)
OLS

QR
0.25

0.50

0.75

-249.67
(-2.26)**

-160.89
(-1.46)

-73.20
(-0.59)

-433.87
(-2.83)**

0.67
(1.36)

-0.32
(-0.65)

0.67
(1.20)

1.49
(2.17)**

SOCECI01

270.37
(2.83)***

248.51
(2.62)***

194.92
(1.82)*

443.26
(3.34)***

SPECI01

22.53
(3.61)***

7.85
(1.27)

10.46
(1.50)

32.63
(3.77)***

LQPRIM01

-0.23
(-3.85)***

-0.18
(-2.95)***

-0.18
(-2.70)***

-0.27
(-3.21)***

LQSERV01

16.78
(3.81)***

8.24
(4.37)***

20.67
(4.94)***

22.98
(3.76)***

CAPITAL

37.80
(2.00)**

57.70
(3.08)***

41.06
(1.94)*

36.41
(1.39)

OCUP%01

271.67
(2.32)**

270.12
(2.32)**

147.50
(1.12)

142.24
(0.88)

UNEM%01

6.38
(3.64)***

6.95
(3.99)***

5.13
(2.61)***

8.42
(3.46)***

DENSITY01

-16.87
(-6.01)***

-17.73
(-6.35)***

-21.48
(-6.82)***

-22.82
(-5.86)***

FOREIN%01

395.85
(3.74)***

274.21
(2.61)**

442.08
(3.72)***

593.25
(4.04)***

DISTMA01

-18.97
(-3.52)***

-13.92
(-2.60)**

-13.84
(-2.10)**

-19.39
(-2.60)**

EASTING

9.49
(3.63)***

10.15
(3.91)***

11.20
(3.82)***

8.76
(2.42)**

COAST

73.99
(5.79)***

54.78
(4.31)***

62.02
(4.32)***

83.35
(4.70)***

0.26

0.28

0.29

Constant

USI01

Ajusted R2

0.42

2

Pseudo R

F-Change

37.07

Note: *, ** and *** represent estimates significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
(a)

To overcome any possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms in the models, a
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator is used to provide a robust estimation of the
covariance matrix of the parameters of a regression-type model.
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Table 5. OLS and QR estimates calculating the local fiscal burden with indirect taxes (a)
OLS

QR
0.25

0.50

0.75

-31.14
(-1.69)*

-1.16
(-0.11)

-15.55
(-0.99)

-23.84
(-1.09)

0.31
(3.88)***

-0.04
(-0.90)

0.17
(2.41)**

0.34
(3.44)***

SOCECI01

6.02
(0.38)

-7.81
(-0.86)

-7.99
(-0.59)

-4.27
(0.23)

SPECI01

1.17
(1.13)

-0.01
(-0.01)

-0.17
(-0.19)

0.05
(0.04)

LQPRIM01

-0.03
(-2.55)*

-0.05
(-0.96)

-0.16
(-1.94)*

-0.03
(-2.88)***

LQSERV01

1.97
(2.70)***

1.45
(3.49)***

2.19
(3.52)***

3.95
(4.56)***

CAPITAL

14.96
(4.77)***

22.88
(12.77)***

17.22
(6.65)**

12.41
(3.34)**

OCUP%01

31.21
(1.88)*

23.26
(1.01)

24.91
(1.28)

13.79
(1.24)

UNEM%01

0.57
(1.97)**

0.16
(0.98)

0.27
(1.08)

0.39
(1.14)

DENSITY01

0.15
(0.32)

-0.56
(-2.13)**

-0.18
(-0.46)

-0.42
(-0.76)

FOREIN%01

5.50
(0.31)

3.33
(0.33)

2.79
(0.19)

16.38
(0.79)

DISTMA01

1.59
(1.78)*

0.75
(1.47)

0.52
(0.68)

1.54
(1.46)

EASTING

0.01
(0.01)

0.15
(0.63)

-0.46
(1.26)

0.53
(1.04)

COAST

1.22
(0.58)

-0.09
(-0.07)

1.85
(1.02)

0.01
(0.01)

0.10

0.13

0.13

Constant

USI01

Ajusted R2

0.11

2

Pseudo R

F-Change

7.24

Note: *, ** and *** represent estimates significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
(a)

To overcome any possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms in the models, a
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator is used to provide a robust estimation of the
covariance matrix of the parameters of a regression-type model.
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Figure 2. Effect of urban sprawl index along the conditional distribution of local fiscal
burden
(a) Effect using total local fiscal burden

(b) Effect using only local direct taxes

(c) Effect using only local indirect taxes
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